We have published this article in collaboration with LawAndTrends to mark the 10th anniversary of the reviewable life sentence. In this report, several lawyers, including our partner Jorge Agüero Lafora, share their opinions on this criminal figure, which has sparked intense debates over the last decade. Jorge offers a detailed analysis of its practical application and the evolution of the system, reflecting on its legal and social implications:
The reviewable life sentence has now been in our legal system for ten years and remains one of the most debated criminal measures of the past decade. This figure was upheld by the Constitutional Court, which ruled that it does not violate Article 25.2 of the Constitution and does not constitute a disguised life sentence. The decisive element for the Court was its reviewable nature—it is not an indefinite penalty without horizon, but a sentence subject to judicial review after serving a minimum number of years, with a real possibility of conditional release if objective requirements are met and the offender shows a favorable evolution. For the Court, there is therefore a real expectation of freedom, and the model is compatible with the mandate for rehabilitation and social reintegration.
However, beyond the constitutional alignment, the reflection on its introduction in 2015 must be considered in the political and social context of the time. The reform was passed following a series of particularly grave and media-covered crimes that generated intense public alarm and a strong sense of insecurity. The legislator responded with a measure of clear symbolic and deterrent content: to convey that the State would react with the utmost severity to absolutely intolerable conduct, and to prevent those responsible for particularly serious crimes from regaining their freedom after serving sentences that part of society considered insufficient.
From the perspective of general deterrence, however, it is debatable whether the increase in sentences has a real effect on the decisions of those committing crimes of this nature. Experience shows that those who commit crimes, especially very serious ones, do not usually rationally weigh the exact duration of the penalty. Moreover, Spain already had very high sentences before 2015 compared to other countries in our European environment. Therefore, I do not believe that, during this time, the reviewable life sentence has reduced the statistics of these serious crimes.
Where it may have a greater impact in the future (which cannot be assessed in these 10 years, but will require many more years) is in preventing the risk of recidivism in cases of extreme severity. The logic of the penalty is clear: if the person has not reached a sufficient degree of reintegration and the prison reports do not support their progress, they will not gain access to freedom. On the other hand, if they improve their situation, accept responsibility for the crime, and receive favorable reports, they may be released. In this way, not by the number of years of the sentence, as occurred before 2015, but by the degree of reintegration, the offender may leave prison permanently, presumably avoiding the commission of new crimes of the same severity.
The practical problem observed by those of us in the legal profession is that the system relies heavily on technical reports that, due to caution, restrictive criteria, or lack of resources, are not easily favorable. If the review depends on evaluations that tend to be negative in practice or educational programs that are not actually available, there is a risk that the penalty will be prolonged indefinitely and, in effect, approach a real life sentence. Furthermore, the risk of expansion cannot be overlooked, as this figure, originally conceived for exceptionally serious crimes, may gradually expand to other cases in response to new punitive social demands.
Ten years later, the question is not just whether the penalty is constitutional, but whether in practice it maintains its genuinely reviewable and exceptional nature. Often, the resources available in penitentiary centers are insufficient to achieve these goals. The investment in them will determine whether it continues to be a legitimate tool of the penal system or whether it becomes a response that could violate Article 25.2 of the Constitution.
