Error in Legal Subsumption and Implicit Intent: The Supreme Court’s Doctrine in Judgment STS 237/2025

Judgment 237/2025, issued by the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court on March 13, 2025, resolves a cassation appeal filed by the private prosecution against the acquittal handed down by the Provincial Court of Cuenca. The case originated with a conviction by Criminal Court No. 2 of Cuenca for an offence of fraudulent insolvency under Article 257.1.2º of the Spanish Criminal Code, based on the conduct of a debtor who, knowing of a judicial seizure order over a tractor, proceeded to conceal and intentionally damage it.

The legal crux of the case centres on whether the subjective element of the criminal offence—that is, the intention to cause harm to the creditor—is duly reflected in the statement of proven facts. The Provincial Court found that it was not, and consequently acquitted the defendant. The Supreme Court, however, overturned this decision, concluding that the subjective element was indeed present in the factum, albeit not expressed literally, and that the acquittal was the result of an erroneous legal subsumption, thereby triggering a breach of law under Article 849.1 of the Criminal Procedure Act (LECrim).

From First Instance Conviction to Acquittal on Appeal

The proceedings began with a conviction by the Criminal Court, which found proven that the defendant, aware of the judicial seizure of the tractor, moved it to a wooded area of difficult access, erased its chassis number to prevent its location, and abandoned it in a state that rendered it unusable. These actions were assessed as constituting the offence of fraudulent insolvency, the court considering that they demonstrated conduct aimed at frustrating the enforcement proceedings to the detriment of the creditor.

However, on appeal, the Provincial Court overturned the conviction and issued an acquittal. The legal reasoning underpinning this decision was that the statement of proven facts in the trial court’s judgment did not expressly or implicitly reflect the defendant’s intent to harm the creditor. The Court emphasised that the Supreme Court’s doctrine prohibits integrating factual elements into the legal reasoning when doing so would operate to the detriment of the accused; thus, the absence of a clear expression of the subjective element in the proven facts precluded upholding the conviction.

The Supreme Court’s Doctrine on the Subjective Element in the Statement of Facts

In resolving the cassation appeal, the Supreme Court examined this interpretation and reiterated its settled case law: the subjective element of the offence forms part of the factual findings, not merely the legal reasoning. This doctrine draws a fundamental distinction between the factual and legal aspects of a judgment. Although the subjective element—such as the intent to defraud the creditor—is inherently an internal mental state, its existence must be proven by objective indicia and must be reflected in the statement of proven facts, either expressly or by inference from the factual description.

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been clear and consistent on this point. In rulings such as STS 1215/2011, STS 163/2019, and STS 708/2021, it is established that intent, including specific or purposive intent, must be present in the factual narrative, as it is an integral component of the criminal offence. This requirement serves a protective function: it prevents a defendant from being convicted on the basis of facts or intentions not declared proven, thereby safeguarding the principles of legality and the right to a defence.

Within this framework, the Court distinguishes two valid ways of incorporating the subjective element. On one hand, it may be described explicitly, for example: “with the intention of hindering enforcement to the detriment of the creditor.” On the other hand, it may be inferred from objective facts described, provided that such inference is unequivocal. What is categorically rejected is the addition of the subjective element solely through legal reasoning when it cannot be deduced from the factual narrative.

Assessment of the Proven Facts in the Present Case

Applying this doctrine to the case at hand, the Supreme Court analysed the statement of facts in the trial court’s judgment, which was adopted unchanged by the Provincial Court. In this statement, it was established that the defendant, aware of the judicial seizure over the tractor, concealed it in a hard-to-reach area, erased its chassis number to prevent identification, partially dismantled it, and abandoned it, thereby causing its deterioration.

According to the Court, these elements are neither neutral nor compatible with mere negligence or unconscious conduct. On the contrary, they demonstrate conduct aimed at obstructing the course of justice and preventing the effectiveness of the seizure. As the Supreme Court explicitly stated: “Expressions such as ‘with full knowledge of the preventive seizure’ and ‘after erasing the chassis number to prevent identification’ are sufficient, without the need to refer to the legal reasoning, to conclude that the defendant engaged in conduct intended to prevent or hinder the effectiveness of the seizure, thereby causing harm to the creditor.”

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the subjective element did indeed form part of the proven facts—not because it was expressed in doctrinal terms, but because it could be directly, logically, and soundly inferred from the objectively established facts.

Application of Article 849.1 LECrim

In light of this finding, the Supreme Court held that the appellate judgment incurred a breach of law through the incorrect application of Article 257.1.2º of the Criminal Code, thereby activating the cassation ground under Article 849.1 LECrim. This provision allows for correction of legal errors where the statement of proven facts is not contested, but an incorrect legal subsumption has been made.

In this case, the Provincial Court relied on an unaltered statement of facts but erroneously interpreted that it did not contain the subjective element of the offence when, in fact, it did. This material error, as it directly affects the legal characterisation of the conduct, may legitimately be reviewed on cassation without requiring a reassessment of the evidence, since it does not entail imposing a new conviction but rather reinstating a first-instance conviction that was improperly set aside.

Conclusion

Supreme Court Judgment 237/2025 reaffirms a well-established jurisprudential line: in offences requiring a subjective or purposive intent—such as fraudulent insolvency—the subjective element must appear in the statement of proven facts. It cannot be deduced exclusively from the legal reasoning or incorporated through ex post facto arguments unless based on logical, clear, and direct inferences from objectively proven facts.

In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that such inferences were not only possible but necessary, given that the defendant’s conduct unequivocally reflected the purpose of obstructing the seizure. Therefore, the Provincial Court committed an error of law in finding that the element was absent, resulting in an unjustified acquittal. The Chamber upheld the cassation appeal filed by the private prosecution, overturned the Provincial Court’s judgment, and reinstated the conviction imposed by the Criminal Court, with all its criminal and civil effects.

This ruling highlights that the structure of a criminal judgment is not a matter of mere form, but performs an essential function in safeguarding fundamental rights. If the proven facts do not contain all the elements of the offence, the conviction is legally invalid; however, if those elements are implicitly present and unequivocal, an acquittal based on denying their existence constitutes an incorrect application of substantive criminal law.

Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision confirms that the subjective element was indeed part of the statement of proven facts, that its absence was wrongly assumed by the Provincial Court, and that its presence fully justified the criminal conviction.