Judgment 402/2025: Jurisprudential Evolution and Protection of the Presumption of Innocence through the Extraordinary Review Remedy

The Exceptional Nature of the Extraordinary Application for Review and its Jurisprudential Evolution

The review application is a procedural remedy of an extraordinary and exceptional nature, as it permits the nullification of final judgments, thereby constituting a derogation, for the specific case, of the principle of res judicata. Its purpose is not to reassess issues of ordinary legality, but to rectify serious material errors that have resulted in an erroneous conviction, thereby affecting the actual innocence of the convicted person.

Traditionally, Article 954.4 (now Article 954.1.d LECrim) required the emergence, after the final judgment, of new facts or evidentiary elements demonstrating the convicted person's innocence. Under this strict interpretation, the application for review necessitated that such new material be conclusive and directly, irrefutably prove that the convicted individual did not commit the offence.

However, as expressly acknowledged in the judgment under analysis, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court — also following the doctrine of the Constitutional Court — has evolved towards a more rights-oriented approach, no longer requiring conclusive proof of innocence, but rather the introduction of a reasonable doubt significantly affecting the evidentiary framework which underpinned the conviction.

In the words of the Court, what is now essential is that the new evidence or supervening fact “re-establish the presumption of innocence by substantially weakening the probative force of the evidence that led to the conviction.” This evolution recognises that the review application need not rely on direct evidence of non-culpability, but may suffice if, in the context of a hypothetical trial, it could reasonably be argued that the presence of such elements at the time of trial might have resulted in an acquittal.

The Specific Case: Review of the 1995 Conviction

The judgment subject to review was delivered on 7 January 1995 by the Provincial Court of Tarragona, convicting the applicant of a series of extremely serious criminal offences (multiple rapes, robberies, and unlawful detentions) committed between 9 and 10 November 1991. The primary incriminating evidence was the identification of the accused in an identification parade by several of the victims.

However, the extraordinary review is grounded in facts and items of evidence that did not exist or were not available at the time of trial, and which significantly undermine the reliability of those identifications.

Among these elements are:

• The existence of previous convictions annulled through other extraordinary remedies concerning similar acts committed on proximate dates and in nearby locations, in which the perpetrator’s genetic profile did not match that of the convicted individual.
• A 1996 Civil Guard report referring to the emergence of an individual who bore a strong physical and phonetic resemblance to the accused, and who later committed rapes following an identical modus operandi.
• The use of the same vehicle — a grey Renault 5 with false number plates — in the various incidents, which was seized while the accused was already in custody, with no explanation provided as to how it remained in circulation.
• The absence of biological evidence in the reviewed case and the failure of other eyewitnesses to identify the accused.

Additionally, the Chamber emphasises that the fact that the victims saw the accused in handcuffs prior to the identification parade may have involuntarily influenced their memory, contaminating their identification. This, together with the annulment of prior convictions due to similar misidentifications, opens a reasonable breach in the reliability of the incriminating evidence.

Grounds for the Decision: Reasonable Doubt as a Basis for Review

The Supreme Court expressly acknowledges that, unlike other cases previously reviewed, the present proceedings do not involve scientific exculpatory evidence (e.g., DNA) or express retractions by the victims. However, the Court assesses the combined strength of the newly presented elements: other overturned convictions, the identical criminal pattern, the physical resemblance between the convicted person and the alternative suspect, and irregularities in the identification procedures.

All these factors, considered collectively, allow for the introduction of a reasonable doubt regarding authorship, sufficient to conclude that, had they been known at the time of trial, they would likely have influenced the trial court’s decision. The Court clarifies that the issue is not to demand a “demonstration of innocence,” but rather to acknowledge that the evidentiary balance underpinning the finding of guilt has been undermined by the new elements.

Consequently, the Chamber finds that the requirements of Article 954.1.d LECrim are met, and that the presumption of innocence resurfaces, inasmuch as the evidentiary structure that supported the final conviction has been dismantled.

Conclusion

Supreme Court Judgment 402/2025 constitutes another milestone in the progressive opening of the extraordinary review remedy towards standards of material justice. It confirms the jurisprudential evolution that, moving beyond a rigid interpretation of Article 954 LECrim, now permits the review of a final conviction when new facts or evidence give rise to a reasonable doubt that would have precluded the original conviction.

This judgment reiterates that criminal proceedings cannot rest solely on personal identifications made under emotionally charged circumstances and lacking procedural safeguards — especially where it has been shown that in analogous cases based on the same type of evidence, misidentifications have occurred, later disproven through scientific means.

In this case, the Supreme Court does not require conclusive evidence of innocence. Rather, it affirms that criminal justice cannot rest upon a judicial truth undermined by compelling new evidence. The judgment demonstrates that the presumption of innocence, although displaced by a final conviction, can regain its full effect when new data seriously question the certainty of authorship.

Accordingly, the Court upholds the extraordinary application for review, declares the annulment of the final 1995 judgment, and issues an acquittal of the applicant, thus restoring the process to a state of equilibrium in accordance with the demands of material justice.

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