Rationality in Self‑Defence: Legal Principles and the Torrejón Case

Legal Framework: Article 20.4 CC and Its Judicial Interpretation

Statutory Text and Structure‍

Article 20.4 CC establishes self‑defence as an exculpatory cause, contingent upon three cumulative conditions:

1. Unlawful aggression
2. Rational necessity of the defensive means employed
3. Absence of sufficient provocation

Doctrinal scholars note that the legislature deliberately omits the term “proportionality” to underscore the functional character of the defensive means, although proportionality is implicitly encompassed by the requirement of rational necessity.

Relevant Case Law on Rational Necessity

1. STS 466/2010: Requires correlation between the intensity of the attack and that of the defence; the least harmful effective means must be chosen.
2. STS 470/2005 & STS 932/2007: Apply an ex ante assessment, considering circumstances, instruments, and alternatives. They distinguish between:
   • Extensive excess: unjustified prolongation of defence after the aggression ends, and
   • Intensive excess: use of excessively injurious means. Both exclude full self‑defence.
3. STS 127/2021: Confirms that if the aggression ceases but the defensive action continues, neither complete nor partial self‑defence is justified.
4. STS 711/2024: Reviews cases of defensive “overdose,” assessing quantity, intensity, and the relationship between established facts and conclusions on the rationality or irrationality of the means used.

Academic Doctrine

Scholars assert that rational necessity comprises two dimensions:

• Subjective: the defender’s emotional or persecutory state, and
• Objective: a technical judgment on the suitability and sufficiency of the means.

Both must be assessed ex ante, but underpinned by objective standards of rationality. The defender must use the least harmful means capable of effectively repelling the aggression. A central doctrinal tension exists between absolutist personal defence (driven by instinct and property protection) and the positive legal order, which imposes limits to safeguard preeminent legal interests, such as life.

Legal Application and Critical Analysis of Rationality in the Torrejón Case

In the case involving the asphyxiation of a suspected thief by an off‑duty municipal police officer in Torrejón de Ardoz, an analysis under Article 20.4 CC clearly excludes self‑defence as an exculpatory justification. Although an unlawful aggression occurred—namely, the attempted theft—it lacked violence or a direct threat to life or physical integrity of the officer or third parties, thereby raising the threshold of rational necessity for any defensive response.

The strangulation manoeuvre employed by the officer, maintained for a prolonged interval (between ten and fifteen minutes) after the suspect was subdued, constitutes, per Supreme Court case law (STS 470/2005, STS 127/2021, STS 711/2024), both an intensive and extensive excess:

• Intensive, due to the objectively irrational means relative to the nature of the attack;
• Extensive, by continuing beyond the cessation of the threat.

Such conduct cannot be protected by the self‑defence exculpation, even in its incomplete form.

The officer’s intoxication does not alter this conclusion. Although it might slightly impair judgment, jurisprudence mandates that even under emotional duress, the individual must employ rational, suitable means and avoid disproportionate violence. The subsequent omission of aid, and indifference to witnesses’ pleas (“Stop—it’s going to kill him!”), reinforce the conclusion that the act was no longer defensive but punitive or vindictive—antithetical to the normative purpose of Article 20.4 CC.

Critical Perspective

The case sharply illustrates the tension between two competing models of penal justification:

• The liberal‑extensive model, which places subjective judgement about means over rationality, enabling individuals to unilaterally decide how to protect property; and
• The guaranteeing constitutional model of Spanish criminal law, which demands technical rationalisation of defence, restricts response to objectively necessary means, and prohibits sacrificing superior legal interests (such as life) in defence of lesser interests (such as property).

Spanish law aligns unambiguously with the latter. Recent jurisprudence confirms the axiological primacy of life, precluding its removal by irrational defensive means. Neither the subjective value of property nor the defender’s emotional perception may override the legal limits imposed by the principle of rational necessity. Defence is not a domain of absolute private sovereignty; it is subject to legal control designed to uphold the fundamental rights of all individuals, including the aggressor.

Conclusions

Given the facts and the applicable legal framework, it is clear that the officer’s actions in the Torrejón case failed to meet the requirement of rational necessity. The conduct combines an intensive excess (due to the lethal nature of the means) with an extensive excess (due to the duration of the defensive manoeuvre beyond the real danger), which excludes the application of self‑defence —whether complete or partial.

Hence, reliance on Article 20.4 CC is legally untenable. The officer is subject to a criminal charge of homicide, with qualification depending on the presence of eventual intent or gross negligence. Any judicial decision in line with STS 711/2024 or STS 127/2021 should conclude that the required rationality of the defensive means was irreparably destroyed.

From a scholarly standpoint, this case vividly demonstrates the regulatory function of criminal law over private violence. Confronted with primal impulses for absolute self‑defence, the law mandates rational restraint, prioritising the protection of life over that of property. Rationality—not emotion—must guide legitimate self‑defence in a society rooted in respect for fundamental rights and the humanitarian principle of punishment.